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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 940716-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

STACEY A. COVINGTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug free zone, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(2)(a)(i) & 8(5)(a)(ix) (1994), and possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), in the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f)
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was defendant "present" at an apartment for which a

search warrant had been issued when he was standing just outside
the only door to the apartment and was known to associate with
one of the apartment's occupants, a suspected drug trafficker?

The trial court's finding that defendant was at the
apartment to be searched when police arrived to execute a search
warrant is a finding of fact.

See generally. State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Factual questions are generally
regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events,
actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as
well as the subjective, such state of mind.") (citation omitted).
A finding of fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.
Id.
2.

Assuming defendant was on the premises of the

apartment when the search warrant was executed, were police
justified in searching his person where they had already
discovered defendant was in possession of drug paraphernalia
during a protective pat-down search of his outer clothing?
The question of whether defendant was within the scope
of the warrant is most appropriately treated as a question of
"fact-to-law" that is reviewed for correctness.

Pena, 932 P.2d

at 936. However, given the factually sensitive nature of this
issue, the trial court should be extended "a measure of
discretion" instead of having its ruling subjected to "close, de
novo review."

Id. at 939-40.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
2

place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) in a drug free zone, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) &
8(5) (ix) (1994), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana)
in drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), possession of a controlled
substance without affixing the appropriate drug tax stamp, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19103(1) (b) (1992), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 13-14).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence
that was seized from his person (R. 28). After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of
law and an order denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 13947).

(A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached hereto as

addendum A.)

Defendant then entered a negotiated plea agreement

in which he pled guilty to the first two counts in the
information in return for a dismissal of the second two counts as
well as other considerations specified in the plea agreement (R.
158-164).
The trial court accepted the plea agreement and
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison on the first count and one year in the
3

Utah County Jail on the second count (R. 174-76).

The court

suspended execution of the sentence and placed defendant on
probation for 36 months (R. 175). Defendant appeals from that
judgment and challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress.1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence, Utah appellate courts recite the facts in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and order.
State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994).

So viewed, the

facts are as follow.
On February 22, 1994, Rachel Anderson was arrested
based on an outstanding warrant.

In a search incident to her

arrest, police officers found two small bags of methamphetamine
concealed in her clothing.

Anderson told police that she had

stolen the drugs several hours earlier from a person named Rick
Close, with whom she had been smoking methamphetamine on the day
of her arrest.

According to Anderson, Close had supplied her

with methamphetamine in the past and had more methamphetamine
packaged in small bindles and ready for sale at his apartment.
She also said that Close was living with Melissa Seamster and
1

Although the record on appeal indicates that defendant
waived his right to appeal when he entered his guilty plea, the
plea was in fact conditioned upon his right to challenge the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. That fact was
made clear at the guilty plea hearing, but it was inadvertantly
omitted from the plea agreement, and hence the trial court's
judgment. Rather than incurring the expense of transcribing the
plea colloquy, the parties intend to supplement the record with a
stipulation to the facts recited above.
4

John Walker in the basement apartment of a white frame house
located at 479 South 100 East (R. 147, 152A-153).
Police were familiar with Close because they had
received "tips" from at least three sources that Close had been
selling methamphetamine within the previous three weeks and
because they had discovered drug paraphernalia in a recent search
of his vehicle (R. 152A).

Officers also knew that Close was

wanted on two active arrest warrants and that Seamster and Walker
were also wanted for outstanding warrants (id.).

According to

Anderson, both Close and Walker were afraid to leave the
apartment for fear of being arrested (R. 152-152A).

Police were

nevertheless able to confirm through surveillance that Close was
in the apartment described by Anderson (R. 192, 206).
Based primarily on the above information, police sought
a search warrant for the basement apartment of the house located
at 479 South 100 East in Pleasant Grove, Utah (R. 147, 149153).2

(A copy of the search warrant and supporting affidavit

2

As it turns out, the building in which Close had taken an
apartment was white on three sides but blue on the side facing
the street, and the exact street address for Close's apartment
was actually 475 South, not 479 South. However, there were only
two apartments in the building, one on the main level and Close's
basement apartment- More importantly, the only entrance to
Close's basement apartment was at the rear of the building, which
was painted white and carried no street address numbers. Members
of the narcotics task force were familiar with the building and
the location of Close's basement apartment because they had
watched it from the back window of their nearby offices. Over
the past year, they had received numerous tips about narcotics
activity in the building and had recently arrested others in the
building on drug related offenses (R. 146-47, 152, 188-89).
Defendant argued below that the errors in the warrant
rendered it invalid. The trial court rejected that claim on the
(continued...)

5

appears at pages 14 9-153 of the record.
attached hereto as addendum B.)

A copy of it also is

Because it was already dark by

the time police had completed their affidavit and warrant
request, and because they knew Close was smoking methamphetamine
earlier in the day and had more methamphetamine packaged for
sale, the officers requested nighttime service authorization so
that they could conduct an immediate search (R. 152). Given the
potential for violence under the facts presented and the concern
that the small bindles of methamphetamine would be destroyed or
concealed if they gave notice of their intent to search the
apartment, the officers also requested permission to execute the
warrant on a no-knock basis (id.).

The requested search warrant

was issued (R. 147, 149-50).
One of the officers that participated in the
investigation of Close and execution of the search warrant was
Deputy Utah County Sheriff Sean Adamson, a four year veteran of
the local narcotics task force with twelve years of experience as
a police officer (R. 187, 197). According to Adamson, police
were familiar not only with Close, but with defendant as well (R.
190-92) . Specifically, although he had not seen defendant at
2

(...continued)
ground that police were personally familiar with the residence
because of their ongoing surveillance efforts. Indeed, the
officers did not rely on address numbers to determine the
apartment to be searched because none appeared on the building
near the apartment. The rest of the description was accurate,
and no officer went to the wrong address. The trial court
therefore concluded that there was no confusion about what
apartment was to be searched and held that the errors were of no
legal consequence (R. 144). Defendant has elected not to
challenge that determination on appeal.
6

Close's apartment, defendant frequented a house in American Fork
that was under surveillance for suspected narcotics distribution
(R. 191). Close likewise frequented the American Fork residence
(R. 191), and, as the trial court found, associated with
defendant (R. 146).
During a pre-search planning session, officers that had
been watching Close's apartment while the warrant was being
prepared reported that defendant was at Close's apartment (R.
191-92) . Officers reviewed the physical layout of the building
and charted a plan for executing the search warrant.

Two

uniformed officers were assigned to make the initial entry and
would be followed by the other officers, including Adamson (R.
191-94).
When the officers arrived at Close's apartment to
execute the warrant at approximately 8:40 p.m. on February 22,
1994, it was dark outside and there was snow on the ground (R.
146, 209-215).

The entry to Close's apartment was essentially

"surrounded" by vehicles and debris (R. 192). A truck with its
hood up was parked within eight to ten feet of the door leading
to Close's apartment (R. 913). There was another vehicle
directly north of the truck, and a third one facing northeast
that was parked behind the truck (R. 211). A pile of debris to
the south of the doorway made movement in that area difficult (R.
192-93) . In fact, the officers were unable to go from the south
corner of the building to the door of the apartment because of
the debris (R. 194). They therefore approached from the
7

northside of the doorway where the eight to ten feet between it
and the truck was clear (R. 210-11).
The entry team encountered defendant at the door
leading down the stairs to Close's basement apartment (R. 146,
194, 205-06).

Although the officers had been told that defendant

was at the apartment, they did not know he was outside until they
encountered him just outside the door (R. 206). Defendant
appeared startled (R. 209), and, rather than have the entry team
further delay their entry, Adamson took custody of defendant and
directed the entry team down the stairs to Close's apartment (R.
194-95, 205-06).
Concerned for his safety as well as that of the entry
team, Adamson ordered defendant to lay on the ground by the truck
and conducted a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of defendant for
weapons (R. 146, 195-96, 204). In so doing, he felt a hard,
cylindrical shaped object about the size of his "pinky" finger in
defendant's front shirt pocket (R. 196-98, 208). From his
experience as a narcotics officer, Adamson recognized the object
in defendant's pocket as a marijuana pipe.3
3

Adamson, also felt

Adamson indicated that there are different types of
marijuana pipes ranging from "bongs that are huge to small
marijuana pipes" (R. 198). According to Adamson, the "bowl
size[] is the key" to knowing whether a pipe is used for tobacco
or marijuana (R. 198). Specifically, tobacco pipes have a large
bowl at the end of a stem, which enables the person to smoke
without continually refilling the pipe. In contrast, marijuana
pipes have only a small bowl because marijuana is smoked in small
amounts at a time called "hits" (R. 198). The object Adamson
felt in defendant's pocket was consistent with a type of
marijuana pipe that is generally made out of "small brass
fittings that can be purchased out of what [are] call[ed] headshops" (R. 196-98).
8

what he believed to be a cigarette package in defendant's pocket
R. 197).
Adamson did not immediately remove either object from
defendant's shirt.

Instead, he waited until the apartment had

been secured and took defendant inside the apartment where he put
him with the other suspects (Close, Seamster and Walker) so that
it woiuld be easier and safer for the officers to watch all of
the suspects (R. 198-99, 205, 213). Adamson then removed the
marijuana pipe and cigarette package from defendant's pocket; an
examination of the package revealed that it contained marijuana.
Defendant was then arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia
and possession of marijuana (R. 199, 217).
After defendant had been taken inside the apartment,
another officer went back up the stairs to where defendant had
been observed and found a bottle of methamphetamine on the ground
in front of the truck (R. 145, 216-17).

The officer saw a second

container in the engine compartment of the truck, which appeared
to have been thrown or tossed there.

Inside the container was a

white powder that, although not a controlled substance, the
officers believed was intended to be mixed with the
methamphetamine prior to its sale (R. 145). Finally, in the
process of booking defendant into jail, another small quantity of
methamphetamine was found in the change pocket of defendant's
Levi jeans (R. 145, 217).

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly determined that defendant was
"present" at Close's apartment when police arrived to execute the
warrant.

His presence at the apartment, association with Close,

and appearance at another house at which drug trafficking was
suspected combined with the fact he was in possession of drug
paraphernalia was sufficient to bring defendant within the scope
of the search warrant.

The search of defendant's person after he

was returned to Close's apartment was therefore proper, and the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be
upheld.
INTRODUCTION
In the proceedings below, the trial court limited its
analysis to those issues that were in dispute.

On appeal,

defendant challenges only the trial court's finding that he was
"present" at Close's apartment at the time of the search and its
consequent conclusion that defendant was within the scope of the
search warrant.

In so doing, defendant has the burden of

demonstrating two distinct points of error.

First, defendant

must demonstrate that the trial court's finding that defendant
was present at Close's apartment at the time police arrived is
clearly erroneous.

Second, assuming defendant was present at the

apartment, defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred
in concluding that he was within the scope of the search warrant.
If defendant prevails on the first point, then he automatically
prevails on the second point.

However, assuming defendant was
10

present, the question of whether he was within the scope of the
warrant requires additional analysis.

Defendant's claims are

addressed below in seriatim,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS "PRESENT" AT CLOSE'S APARTMENT
WHEN POLICE ARRIVED TO EXECUTE THEIR WARRANT
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court's finding that he was present at Close's apartment when
police arrived to execute the search warrant is clearly
erroneous.

See generally, Pena, 869 P.2d at 35 (factual

questions are those issues that are based on empirical evidence).
In order to make such a showing, it is defendant's burden to
"marshal the evidence in support of the [trial court's] findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly
erroneous."

State v. A House and 1.37 Acres, 253 Utah Adv. Rep.

30, 33 n.4 (Utah 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

Absent such an effort, Utah appellate courts "assume[]

that the record supports the findings of the trial court and
proceed[] to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case."
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant has not taken up this burden.

Based on that

failure alone, this Court may assume that the trial court's
finding that defendant was present at Close's apartment is
11

supported by the record evidence and proceed to the question of
whether defendant was within the scope of the warrant.

In any

event, there was ample evidence to support the trial court's
finding.
A.

Defendant's Presence at the Only Door to
Close's Apartment and His Known
Association With Close Supports the
Trial Court's Determination that
Defendant Was Present At Close's
Apartment When the Search Warrant Was
Executed.

The trial court properly rejected defendant's claim
that because he was standing outside of Close's apartment, as
opposed to inside the apartment, he was not "present" at the
apartment when police arrived to execute the search warrant (R.
143).

In so doing, the trial court recognized that the question

was not as simple as whether defendant was inside or outside of
the apartment.

Rather, resolution of that question required

consideration of whether the facts indicated that defendant was
at the location to be searched.
When first encountered by police, defendant was
standing at the only door to Close's apartment, which is the only
door leading inside the house on that side of the building.
Exhibit 3.4

See

Moreover, as the trial court found, defendant was

4

Exhibit 3 is a photograph submitted by defendant that
shows the rear of the building where Close's basement apartment
was located (R. 207). However, police did not enter the rear
door that is visible in Exhibit 3 because it did not lead to
Close's apartment. Though not visible in Exhibit 3, the door to
Close's was around the corner and to the north of the door to the
covered porch appearing in Exhibit 3. Police passed through the
porch and descended the steps to Close's apartment (R. 210, 215).
(continued...)
12

"'walled in' by trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the
truck with the raised hood to the east, and the apartment to the
west" (R. 142). Also, as Adamson explained, the area immediately
south of the door to Close's apartment was impassable because
there was a pile of debris between the door and the driveway.
Under the circumstances, the only reason anybody would have been
standing where defendant was located would be to enter or exit
Close's apartment.

Given these facts alone, it cannot be said

that the trial court's finding that defendant was present at
Close's apartment is clearly erroneous.
In this case, however, additional evidence supports the
trial court's finding.
associate with Close.

Specifically, defendant was known to
Defendant and Close also frequented

another house that was under police surveillance for drug
trafficking.

Given Close's history of drug activity and the fact

4

(...continued)
The other house in Exhibit 3 is directly south of
Close's apartment. It is that building with which defendant
claimed Close's apartment shared a common area, including the
spot at which defendant was standing when police arrived. The
trial court rejected that claim because, as the photograph shows,
the spot where defendant was standing (the "x" denoted "SC" on
Exhibit 3) was plainly associated with Close's apartment and not
the house to the south (R. 142, 212-13).
The other object that was drawn on the photograph
indicates where the truck with the raised hood was parked at the
time of the search (R. 213). Also, as Adamson explained, the
debris that was to the south of Close's door had been removed by
the time Exhibit 3 was created. In contrast, the place where the
truck and other vehicles were parked at the time of the search
appears to be cluttered with debris that was not present when the
warrant was executed (R. 209-11). Finally, while Exhibit 3 was
apparently taken some months after the search was conducted and
during the daytime, at the time police executed the search
warrant it was dark and the ground was covered with snow (R. 209,
215) .
13

that officers knew Close had additional methamphetamine for sale
in his apartment, coupled with defendant's own suspected
involvement in drug activity, it was reasonable to infer that
defendant was visiting Close.

That is particularly true because

no other apparent reason exists for defendant's presence at the
door to Close's apartment.

Under the unique facts of this case,

the trial court properly determined that defendant was present at
the place to be searched at the time of the search.
That determination is critical because the United
States Supreme Court has held that "a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981) (footnote omitted).
Accord State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) (approving
suspect's restraint by handcuffing during execution of search
warrant "to prevent [suspect] from secreting contraband and to
preserve premises during the search").
Under Summers and its progeny, the brief detention of
defendant just outside Close's apartment was clearly proper.
Also, as the State argued below, concern for officer safety
justified Adamson's brief pat-down search of defendant under
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968) (R.
58-9).5

Defendant implicitly recognized as much because he did

5

The entry team hesitated briefly when they unexpectedly
encountered defendant at Close's door, and Adamson was concerned
(continued...)
14

not contest the State's claim that the brief pat-down search of
his person was supported by a concern for officer safety.
does defendant take issue with it on appeal.

Nor

See State v.

Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (holding that "where a
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing
[allegedly] unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal").
Defendant instead argued only that he was not present
at Close's apartment and therefore should not have been subjected
to any search whatsoever.

For the reasons stated above, the

trial court properly rejected that claim.
The question remains, however, whether the additional
search of defendant after he was returned to Close's apartment
(the search in which Adamson removed the marijuana pipe and
cigarette package from defendant's shirt pocket) was justified.
As demonstrated below, that search was proper because Adamson
5

(...continued)
that defendant might warn Close and the others in the apartment
of the impending police entry. As an experienced narcotics
officer, Adamson no doubt realized that the drug industry is one
that is "rife with deadly weapons." United States v. Truiillo.
809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.), cert.denied,
482 U.S. 916, 107
S.Ct. 3191 (1987) (cited approvingly by this Court in State v.
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah App. 1991)). See also United
States y. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 861 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[i]t is not
unreasonable to assume that a dealer of narcotics might be
armed"). Indeed, the officers emphasized that concern in their
search warrant affidavit (R. 152). The three known occupants of
the apartment were all wanted on outstanding arrest warrants. It
was also dark outside, and defendant appeared "startled" upon
seeing the police (R. 209). As the Court recognized in Summers,
the execution of a search warrant under such circumstances may
give rise to "sudden violence" and officers must "routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Summers, 452
U.S. at 7602, 101 S.Ct. at 2594.
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knew defendant had a marijuana pipe in his pocket.

That fact

brought defendant within the scope of the warrant.
B.

The Discovery of Drug Paraphernalia in
Defendant's Shirt Pocket During a Terry
Frisk Gave Rise to Probable Cause to
Believe Defendant Was Engaged in Illegal
Narcotics Use. Combined with His
Presence at Close's Apartment, That Fact
Brought Defendant Within the Scope of
the Search Warrant.

When Adamson conducted a Terry search of defendant, he
felt a marijuana pipe in defendant's shirt pocket.
v. Dickerson,

U.S.

In Minnesota

, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993), the

Supreme Court held that if "a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour and
mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized
by the officer's search for weapons" under Terry.

In this case,

it is undisputed that Adamson detected what he immediately
recognized to be an illegal marijuana pipe in defendant's shirt
pocket in the course of a proper Terry search.
Adamson's discovery of the marijuana pipe in
defendant's pocket served to bring defendant within the scope of
the search warrant.

That fact, combined with police knowledge of

defendant's frequent visits to another suspected drug house in
American Fork, his association with Close (a known drug user and
drug dealer) and his presence at Close's apartment where probable
cause existed to believe narcotics use and distribution was
ongoing gave rise to the individualized suspicion necessary to
distinguish this case from Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 90, 100
16

S.Ct. 338 (1979).

Ybarra condemns the practice of searching

those present when a search warrant is executed based solely on
their presence at the area to be searched.

Plainly, defendant

was not merely present at the place to be searched.

Police had

an independent basis to suspect defendant was involved in
narcotics use based on his possession of drug paraphernalia.
Defendant was therefore within the scope of the search warrant,
and his reliance on Ybarra is misplaced.
Even if defendant's possession of the marijuana pipe
was insufficient to bring defendant within the scope of the
warrant, it provided probable cause to arrest him for possession
of drug paraphernalia.

Defendant was therefore subject to a

search incident to his arrest.

See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d

1107, 1112 (Utah App. 1988) (where police have probable cause to
arrest a suspect, they may contemporaneously search the suspect
incident to that arrest).

Accordingly, even assuming the trial

court erred in holding the search of defendant's person was
within the scope of the search warrant, its denial of defendant's
motion may be affirmed on the ground that the search was a proper
search incident to defendant's arrest for possession of drug
paraphernalia.

See State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah

App. 1991); State v. Droneburcr. 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App.
1989) (a trial court's judgment may be affirmed on any proper
ground apparent from the record even if the trial court assigned
another reason for its holding).
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STATEMENT REGARDING NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND
DESIRABILITY OF A PUBLISHED OPINION
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed and
the legal issues presented on appeal have been narrowly defined.
It therefore seems unlikely that oral argument will be of much
assistance to this Court,
None of the issues raised by defendant are matters of
first impression.

On the contrary, no matter how this case is

resolved, it appears that no new legal ground will be broken by
the Court's opinion.

Accordingly, it does not appear that

disposition of this case by published opinion is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should uphold the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm
defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c/ffi^day of April, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

&cs/.
TODD A. UTZING!

Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
Trial Court's Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Suppress

FILED
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTLY/™ Judicial District Court

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

g ^ M f H
0\K

)

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 7 / ( ^ 9 ^
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400228
DATE: July 18, 1994
STACEY COVINGTON,

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
Defendant

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed
May 4, 1994. A hearing on this motion was held June 22, 1994. The Court, after carefully
considering the memoranda of counsel, entertaining argument of counsel, and having been
advised of the facts and law pertaining to this case, now enters the following:

I.
FACTS
On February 22, 1994, officers of the Pleasant Grove police department arrested
Rachel Anderson pursuant to warrant. When officers discovered methamphetamine on her
person, Anderson said that she had stolen the drug from one Rick Close and that there was
more of the drug at Mr. Close's residence. Officers knew of Mr. Close, having investigated
and arrested him a number of times in the recent past. Moreover, Mr. Close's basement
apartment was near the offices occupied at that time by the Narcotics Task Force (NET).
Indeed, officers had observed the entrance to Mr. Close's apartment from their office window.
Based upon Anderson's information, along with other information including their
personal knowledge of Close, officers obtained a search warrant from the Honorable John C.
Backlund of the Fourth Circuit Court. The warrant authorized "search of. . . [t]he downstairs

W k
Deputy

apartment and the persons of all individuals present at 479 South 100 E a s t . . . for the
presence of Rick Close, John Walker and Melissa Seamster" (Co-defendants in this case) and
drug-related evidence.

Moreover, the warrant describes the building as "a white frame

building containing two apartments." The description of the apartment was based upon the
officers1 personal acquaintance with the premises. However, the correct address of the
building is 475. South 100 East and the building is white on three sides but blue on the side
facing the street.
At the time this search warrant was issued, there were active warrants for the arrest of
the three named individuals. As stated in the supporting affidavit, officers believed that all
three were then living in the apartment—a fact later confirmed during the execution of the
warrant. Moreover, to prevent the destruction, loss or sale of the drug-related evidence
believed to be in Close's apartment, officers applied for and obtained authorization for
nighttime, no-knock entry, pursuant to U.C.A. 77-23-5(1).
Pleasant Grove uniformed officers and NET officers executed the warrant at 8:40 p.m.
on February 22, 1994. As they approached the only entrance to the apartment, on the east
side of the building, officers observed Defendant Stacey Covington standing just outside the
apartment door. Near the Defendant to the east was the front end of a pickup truck with its
hood raised. NET officers recognized Defendant as a person associated with Rick Close and
the others named in the warrant. Some of the officers approached the Defendant, restrained
him, and conducted a frisk or "pat down9* search of his person. This pat down search resulted
in the discovery of both a marijuana pipe and marijuana.
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Following this discovery, officers brought Defendant into the apartment and secured
him along with the other Co-defendants, while they awaited transportation to the Pleasant
Grove Police Department. Officers then found a small canister on the ground near the spot
where the Defendant had been restrained. The canister proved to contain 7.3 grams of
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. Officers also found a second container in the
engine compartment of the truck, which appeared to have been thrown or tossed there.
Within the container was a white powder non-controlled substance which officers believe to
have been intended for mixture with the methamphetamine prior to sale.
As with all arrestees, Defendant was searched again at the police department, at which
time they found a small quantity of methamphetamine on the Defendant's person. Defendant
was subsequently charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute
in a Drug Free Zone (a First Degree Felony), Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in
a Drug Free Zone (a Class A Misdemeanor), Illegal Drug Tax (a Third Degree Felony), and
(Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone (a Class A
Misdemeanor).

n.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Whether certain errors in the address and description of the premises to be searched
render warrant defective when officers were neither mistaken nor confused as to the
location described.

B.

Whether Defendant, who was searched while standing just outside the only door to
apartment, fell within the scope of warrant authorizing search of "apartment and the
person of all individuals present."
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C.

Whether affidavit and request for search warrant gave reasonable cause to support
issuance of warrant authorizing nighttime search under U.C.A. 77-23-5(1).

m.
ANALYSIS

A. Description of the Premises
The Defendant seeks to invalidate the search warrant based on inaccuracies in its
identification and description of the targeted premises. The Court considers this an impotent
ploy on the facts of this case.

It is well-established that the purpose of the description of the

premises is to enable the officers executing the warrant to locate the premises. Thus "[t]he
description is sufficient if the officer executing the search warrant can with reasonable effort
ascertain and identify the place to be searched." State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d 970 at 972 (Utah
App. 1989) citing State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 at 1102-03 (Utah, 1985).
In this case, NET officers were personally familiar with the residence, having observed
Close, one of its residents, for some time. Moreover, affiant Officer Michael Blackhurst, and
other NET officers were all present and participated in the execution of the warrant. None of
the officers went to a wrong location. Neither did the officers rely upon address numbers to
determine the correct house: the numbers did not appear anywhere on the building.
Defendant does not dispute that the accurate parts of the description, coupled with the
officers' actual acquaintance with the premises, neither left confusion as to the location of the
premises nor resulted in a search of the wrong premises. The three persons named in the
warrant were all in the apartment and were all arrested pursuant to warrant. The errors in
description of the premises amount to nothing of legal consequence.
4

B. Scope of the Warrant
The warrant in this case authorized the search of the "apartment and the person of all
individuals present." Defendant argues that because he was standing outside, he was not
"present" at the apartment at the time he was spotted and searched. However, "it has been
generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of
any buildings or vehicles within the •curtilage1 even though they are not specifically described
in the warrant," State v. Basturo. 807 P.2d 162 (Kan. App. 1991, afTd. 821 P. 2d 327 (Kan.
1991), see also United States v. Gottschalk. 915 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir., 1990) (authorized
search of premises included search of car inside curtilage). Accordingly, the issue here is
whether, at the time of search, Defendant was within the curtilage of the premises.
The curtilage of a home is "usually defined as a small piece of land, not necessarily
enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for domestic
purposes in the conduct of family affairs." (State v. Render. 588 P.2d 447 at 449 (Haw.
1979) (emphasis added)). A number of factors, as enumerated by the United States Supreme
Court, should be considered in reaching a determination of the extent of the curtilage in any
given case. These factors include (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the
area has been fenced or enclosed; (3) the nature and uses of the area; and (4) what steps have
been taken to protect the area from observation. United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294 (1977).
In this case, Defendant was located at the time of search immediately east of the only
entrance to the basement apartment. He was standing within ten feet of the house, between
the apartment door and a nearby truck with its hood raised. Both the Defendant and the truck
were well within a space that had the obvious appearance of a parking and yard area for
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residents of the apartment. The area is bounded by trees and debris to the north and a dirt
driveway to the south.
Defendant would characterize the area to the east of the house as a common area for
both the house mentioned in the warrant and the house immediately to the south. It is true
that the driveway flows into a large dirt parking area that is shared by Mr. Close's apartment
and the building or buildings to the south. (At the time of the arrest-February-the dirt was
snow-packed.) However, the spot where the Defendant was first discovered and searched was
so close to the back of the house and far enough away from the line of the driveway as to
leave no room for doubt that he was associated with the house. In effect, the Defendant was
"walled in" by the trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the truck with the raised hood
to the east, and the apartment to the west. This small area, adjacent to the apartment, clearly
fell within the curtilage.
The scope of the warrant authorized a search for drugs which might be found on the
person of anyone present, including the Defendant. Given Defendant's known association
with persons who lived at the residence, coupled with his proximity to the apartment door, he
was "present" at the apartment and consequently within the scope of the warrant.

C. Nighttime Search
Defendant relies on State v. Rowe (no citation given) to sustain the proposition that
the supporting affidavit here did not furnish "reasonable cause" for authorizing a nighttime
search. In Rowe, the court focused on U.C.A. 77-23-5(1), which states in pertinent part:

The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in the
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to
6

believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which
case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night.

There are two reported decisions in the Rowe case. In State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730
(Utah App. 1991) (Rowe I herein), the Court of Appeals held invalid a nighttime search
warrant supported by an affidavit containing only the pre-printed statutory language quoted
above. The warrant was devoid of elaboration of any reasonable basis for its conclusion. In
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah, 1992) (Rowe II herein), the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals. Rowe II did not disturb the decision that the bare conclusion in the
affidavit, without elaboration or basis, could not support a nighttime search. It did, however,
rule that nighttime search under such a warrant was not a fundamental violation of the
Defendant's rights which would require suppression of the evidence. The Court observed:

Where the alleged violation . . . is not 'fundamental* suppression [sic] is
required only where (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been
followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision of the [r]ule. . . . It is only where the violation also implicates
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad faith or has
substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate
remedy, Rowe II at 429.

The nighttime search warrant in the instant case is clearly appropriate under Rowe I.
In any event, no allegation has been made which would justify the exclusion of any evidence
under Rowe H After establishing throughout his supporting affidavit that persons on the
premises were likely in possession of and selling controlled substances, Officer Blackhurst,
stated his experience concerning persons who sell small quantities of methamphetamine.
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"Such persons will typically sell what they have as quickly as they can until they are out of
inventory . . .". (Paragraph 13.) Officer Blackhurst had previously qualified himself in the
affidavit as an expert on narcotics trafficking in the area. (Paragraph 1.) Moreover,
Paragraph 14 establishes that officers had acted in good faith, upon receipt of critical evidence
mentioned in the affidavit, to prepare and obtain a search warrant but that execution likely
would be impossible before dark. His conclusion that evidence would be lost or destroyed if
search were delayed rested upon reliable information indicating that small quantities of
methamphetamine were being distributed at the apartment, (paragraphs 4, 8, and 12), coupled
with his experience that small quantities would be sold as quickly as possible. This hardly
resembles the recitation of statutory factors in a check-off form of the type proscribed by
Rowe I.
But in any event, there is no evidence, indeed no allegation, that but for the nighttime
authorization this search would not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive. There
is no evidence of an intentional and deliberate disregard of the statute. On the contrary, there
is evidence of a good faith attempt to balance the statutory concern for nighttime searches
with the need promptly to obtain the suspected contraband and arrest the individuals known to
be in the apartment. Hence, there is no basis for the application of Rowe II to the instant
case. There is, in sum, no reason to suppress the evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION
The search of the Defendant pursuant to a warrant which misstated the address of the
premises to be searched and inaccurately described it as a white frame house was lawful,
inasmuch as officers were not misled as to the correct location of the search. Moreover, the
S

Defendant's presence within the curtilage of the apartment connected him with the apartment
so as to be "present" at the apartment and thus within the scope of a warrant authorizing a
search of the apartment and the person of all individuals present. Finally, the affidavit in
support of the warrant stated reasonable cause for the execution of a nighttime search and, in
any event, Defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated as a result of a purportedly
inadequate affidavit.

V. RULING
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this

*j dtty .

day of

BY THE COURT

mZt

V<
iddge Lynn W. Davis
cc:

James R Taylor
Shelden R. Carter
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Addendum B
Search Warrant and
Supporting Affidavit

Kay Bryson
Utah County Attorney
James R. Taylor *3199
Deputy County Attorney
100 East Center Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(601) 370-8026
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IK THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY. AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
IN THE MATTER OF A

t

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

:

AFFIDAVIT AND REOUEST

:

FOR SEARCH WARRANT

Comes now Mike Blackhuret having been duly evorn who deposes
and states:
1. I am a peace officer for the State of Utah employed by
the Pleasant Grove Police Department.
I have been a peace
officer for in excess of 26 years and am currently assigned as
Project Director for the Narcotics Task Force (NET).
I have
received training in the investigation of narcotics related
offenses and have extensive experience in the field having
executed hundreds of search warrants of locations where narcotics
vere expected to be sold. I have conducted surveillance and have
personally reviewed
most of
the narcotics
investigations
conducted within this county during the past three years.
I am
familiar with the patterns and practices of persons dealing in
illegal Narcotics in this area.
2. On the 22nd day of February, 1994 Rachel Anderson D.0.B.
12-1-70 was arrest pursuant to two separate criminal warrants by
officers of the Pleasant Drove Police Department. At the time of
her arrest officers found two small bags (3 grams total) of white
powdery substance concealed in her clothing.
Anderson stated
that the powder was "crank", a common street term for illegal
methamphetamine.
The packaging of the material was consistent
with such a statement.
I field tested the powder using a Nik
Reagent system which indicated positive for methamphetamine.
3. Anderson was arrested at a 7-11 store at Hain and State,
/Pleasant Grove.
At the time of her arrest she stated that she
had just stolen the methamphetamine from someone at a residence
across the street.
She described a white apartment building
across the street and said it was in an upstairs apartment.
4.

After her

arrest I

interviewed Anderson further.

She

DEFENSE ATTORNEY
MAR 1 1 1994-5C

f

fB 2 5 J994-PD

stated that she had stolen the drugs several hours before
(approximately 1500 hours, 2/22/94) from Rick Close's tool bow
and that he had additional quantities of methamphetamine in
bindles, ready for sale.
She stated that Close vas not avare
that she had taken any as of yet. She stated that Close lives in
a house at 479 South 100 East in the basement apartment vhich is
entered In the rear. She stated that Close has been supplying
her vith amphetamine and that she has been smoking meth vith
Close today. Anderson stated that Close vas living vith Melissa
Seamster and John Walker.
5. Anderson's physical appearance is very consistent vith
substantial use of methamphetamine.
She has open sores on her
face and head and appears to be extremely thin and emaciated* Her
eyes vere bloodshot and draining. Training vhich I have received
has indicated that such symptoms are consistent vith addiction
and use of methampheteminee.
6. Anderson has a substantial criminal history Including
longtime involvement vith controlled substances.
Her history
includes possession of amphetamines, prescription fraud, and
uttering forged prescriptions. NET officers have purchased drugs
from Anderson and have arrested Anderson In possession of
controlled substances on other occasions.
7.
Officers have verified from personal observation that
Kick Close resides at 479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove.
The
building is a vhite frame building containing two apartments.
One is on the main or ground level and the other is a basement
apartment entered from the rear on the east side.
8. Rick Close has a substantial history of involvement vith
controlled substances. Officers have received tips from at least
three
separate
sources
that
Close
has
been
selling
methamphetamine vithin the past three veeks.
Officers recently
searched^ the vehicle of Close and found drug paraphernalia.
There are presently tvo active varrants for the arrest of Rick
Close from the Orem Department of the Fourth Circuit Court vith
bail in the amount of S470 and the Justice Court for Pleasant
Grove City vith bail in the amount of S2,000, cash only.
9. Melissa Seamster Is known to be John
ex-vife.
Seamster has a criminal history
violations. A non-ball varrant of arrest for
hae been issued by the Fourth Circuit Court
active.

Walker's vlfe or
Involving alcohol
Melissa Seamster
and ie currently

10.
John Walker, D.Q. B. 5*16-72, is the subject of an
active varrant of arrest Issued by the Justice Court of Pleasant
brove for the offenses of assault, criminal mischief, illegal
consumption of alcohol and other misdemeanor offenses. Bail hae
been set at si,000, cash only.
11. Anderson stated

to me that Walker vas

in the apartment

and had been for come time. She elated that he will not come out
because he is afraid of being arrested.
12. HET officers have b^en receiving tips regarding this
residence from numerous sources during the past year.
The
information consistently indicates that controlled substances are
being sold from
that location.
Officers
have conducted
surveillance at various times during the past six months and have
arrested people residing
in the building and
found drug
paraphernalia
and
controlled
substances
including
tnethsrophetamine*
Officers observed a purchase of narcotics from
the house
by Darcy McDonald
on 6-30-93.
McDonald vas
subsequently arrested and charged vith a narcotics related
offense.
13.
It is my experience that persons who deal in small
bindles of methamphetamine will have, in their possession or at
their residence, narcotics and other evidence of trafficking
including but not limited to cash, weapons, baggies, scales, buyowe sheets and paraphernalia for the use, storage, Bale or
preparation of narcotics. Such persons will typically sell vhat
they have as quickly as they can until they are out of inventory
at which time they will attempt to "re-up" or purchase a large
quantity to be divided into smaller bindles for sale.
14. It is currently just after dark on the same day when
Anderson vas arrested and provided the information described
above. Although I have attempted to prepare this documentation
vith reasonable dispatch, I vill be unable to serve the warrant
before dark.
If a search is delayed Important evidence may be
lost, destroyed or distributed.
15. It ie also my experience that when drugs are being used
and sold in a residence occupied by several adults, all of whom
have criminal histories and experience vith narcotics that all
persons 'on the premises will likely have relevant evidence on
their persons or in their possession. Moreover, small bindles of
drugs as expected in this matter can be readily hidden on a
person or destroyed once the intent to search is revealed.
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued for the
search, day or night, of the residence described above for the
presence of John Walker and Melissa Seamster and narcotics and
other evidence of trafficking including but not limited to cash,

DISCOVERY SENT TO
DEFENSE ATTORNEY
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weapons, baggies, scales, buy-ove sheets and paraphernalia
the use, storage, sale or preparation of narcotics.
Dated this

ubecribed

day of February/1994.

to and svorn before me

this

1994 £jJ?j£? »•
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for

DISGOVtrtY 6tNT TO
DEFENSE ATTORNEY

Kay Bryaon
Utah County Attorney
James R. T a y l o r #3199
Deputy County Attorney
100 E a s t C e n t e r S u i t e 2100
P r o v o , Utah 8460b
(601) 370-8026
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
IN THE MATTER OF A

«

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
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SEARCH WARRANT

t* •

THE STATE
UTAH:

OF UTAH TO

ANY POLICE

OFFICER OF

THE STATjE.-.-QF
• * • f'c.

:: I -••

It h§e been established by oath or affirmation ma^e or
submitted this *~<-' day of February, 1994 that there is probable
cause to believe the following:
1- The
conduct.

property

described below

is

evidence

of illegal

2. The property described below is most probably
upon the person or at the premises set forth below.

located

1

MJ3.
The person in possession of the property is party to the
aM'eged illegal conduct.
4, There is a reasonable basis
eearcl
search after daylight hours.

for officers

to conduct a

There is a reason to believe that if prior notice is
gii^en of officers'© intent and authority to search that evidence
giiV'en
may be lost or destroyed before it can be seized.
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AHD EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons:
The downstairs apartment and the person of all individuals
present at 479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove. The building is a
white frame building containing two apartments.
The basement
apartment is entered from the rear on the east side.
You are directed to search for the presence of Rick Close,
John Walker and Melissa Seamster and narcotics and other evidence
of trafficking including but not limited to cash, weapons,

150

baggies,
storage,

s c a l e s , buy-ove s h e e t s and p a r a p h e r n a l i a f o r
s a l e or p r e p a r a t i o n of n a r c o t i c s .

the use,

THIS WARRANT WAY BE SERVED:

qfo

Day or night without prior
Intent to search.

notice

of

authority or

IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring the
property forthwith before me at the above named court or to hold
the same in your possession pending further order of this court.
You sre instructed to leave a receipt for the property vith the
person in whose possession the property is found or at the
premises where the property was located* After the execution of
the warrant you shall promptly make a verified return of the
warrant to me together with a written inventory of any seized
evidence, identifying the place where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT
DATE OF ISSUANCE.

BUST BE SERVED

WITHIN TEN (IB) DAYS

Dated this ^"2-dpv of Feb., 1994 at 0 ' *"^

FRQH THE

. m.

Magistrate

DISCOVERY ScfoT TO
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